Digital Defenders

Identity & human attacks · 22

5 popular ways attackers bypass MFA

MFA isn't broken. Attackers just go around it.

YouLogin pageMFA checkSession cookieApp1 · Weak account recoveryreset flow skips the checksskips login + MFA3 · Help desk resetmoves MFA to attacker2 · Push bombingapprove to make it stop4 · SIM swapsteals SMS codes5 · Infostealercopies cookie from PCPasskeys / FIDO2 stop 2 and 4, once weaker fallbacks are removed.1 and 3 need recovery as strong as login; 5 needs device-bound, short-lived sessions.
Login flowAttackYouLogin page1 · Weak accountrecoveryreset skips login + MFAMFA check2 · Push bombingapprove to make it stop3 · Help-desk resetmoves MFA to attacker4 · SIM swapsteals SMS codesSession cookie5 · Infostealercopies cookie from PCAppPasskeys / FIDO2 stop 2 and 41 and 3 need recovery as strong as login; 5needs device-bound sessions
Diagram: MFA bypass

Multi-factor authentication stops most password attacks, so attackers aim at what sits around it: the person approving the prompt, the processes that reset or recover the account, and the session cookie the site hands out after a successful login. These five methods show up again and again:

  1. Weak account recoveryA password reset or recovery flow that is weaker than the login itself. Keycloak CVE-2026-18963 (Aug 2026, CVSS 9.1) let an unauthenticated attacker skip the emailed reset token and set a new password for any account, admins included.
  2. Push bombing (MFA fatigue)Endless approve prompts until you tap yes. Uber, 2022: an attacker then messaged the contractor posing as IT.
  3. Help-desk resetThe attacker calls IT pretending to be you and asks to move your MFA to a new device, a Scattered Spider favourite.
  4. SIM swapYour mobile carrier is tricked into moving your number, so SMS codes go to the attacker.
  5. Infostealer cookie theftMalware on your PC copies session cookies after you have already passed MFA.

What works: make every way back into an account at least as strong as the login. Patch identity products quickly, test reset flows like any other login, and require MFA or a fresh identity check before a reset takes effect. Phishing-resistant MFA (passkeys and FIDO2 security keys) removes pushes and SMS codes altogether, as long as weaker fallbacks are switched off. It does not fix a broken reset flow, a help desk re-enrolling an attacker or malware stealing a cookie after login, so add strict caller verification, short-lived and device-bound sessions, and alerts on new devices and impossible travel.

Real-world examples

Keycloak CVE-2026-18963: account takeover through password resetA crafted request jumped straight to the "set new password" step. Fixed in Keycloak 26.7.2; Red Hat's stopgap was to turn off "Forgot password".thehackernews.com ↗ CISA & FBI AA23-320A: Scattered SpiderPush bombing, SIM swaps and help-desk social engineering to reset passwords and MFA.cisa.gov ↗
Sources

Updated on 12 Nov 2026