Digital Defenders

Famous vulnerabilities · 07

EternalBlue, WannaCry & NotPetya (MS17-010)

A leaked NSA exploit that turned unpatched Windows networks into falling dominoes.

  • CVE CVE-2017-0144
  • Patch MS17-010, Mar 2017
  • Leaked Apr 2017
  • Protocol SMBv1, port 445
  • KEV Yes
Shadow BrokersleakNSA exploit for SMBv1,April 2017Unpatched WindowsSMBv1 open on port 445Worm spreadsmachine to machine, nologinWannaCry /NotPetyaencrypts or wipesWannaCry, May 2017200,000+ systems, 150 countries, NHS disruptedNotPetya, June 2017wiper; damage over $10 billionFix: MS17-010 (March 2017)turn off SMBv1, segment networks, keep offline backups
Shadow Brokers leakNSA exploit for SMBv1, April 2017Unpatched WindowsSMBv1 open on port 445Worm spreadsmachine to machine, no loginWannaCry / NotPetyaencrypts or wipesWannaCry, May 2017200,000+ systems, 150countries, NHSdisruptedNotPetya, June2017wiper; damage over$10 billionFix: MS17-010 (March 2017)turn off SMBv1, segment networks, keep offlinebackups
Diagram: EternalBlue

EternalBlue is an exploit for a flaw in SMBv1, the old Windows file-sharing protocol on port 445. One crafted packet overflows a buffer and runs code on the target, with no login. It was an NSA exploit that a group called the Shadow Brokers leaked in April 2017, a month after Microsoft had already shipped the fix, MS17-010.

Attackers turned it into worms within weeks. On 12 May 2017, WannaCry ransomware hit more than 200,000 systems in 150 countries and disrupted over a third of NHS trusts in England, cancelling thousands of appointments. On 27 June, NotPetya arrived through a hijacked update of M.E.Doc, Ukrainian tax software, and used EternalBlue to spread inside networks. It looked like ransomware but was a wiper: files could not be recovered. The US, UK and others blamed Russia, and a White House assessment put the total damage above $10 billion; Maersk alone estimated $200–300 million in lost revenue.

The patch had been out for about two months before WannaCry. What failed was the basics: unpatched and unsupported Windows, SMB reachable far more widely than needed, and flat networks with nothing to stop a worm. The lessons still hold: patch protocols that let attackers move between machines quickly, turn off SMBv1, segment networks, and keep offline backups.

Real-world examples

UK National Audit Office: WannaCry and the NHSThe official investigation: how many trusts were hit and why basic IT security would have prevented it.nao.org.uk ↗ 5 years after NotPetya: lessons learnedCSO Online on the wiper that hit Maersk, Merck and many more.csoonline.com ↗
Sources

Updated on 12 Nov 2026